Shop stewards’ leadership, left-wing activism and collective workplace union organisation by Darlington, RR
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The essence of Marx’s understanding of society involves the unity of objective and 
subjective factors throughout history, examining the process by which people are 
both moulded by the world around them and at the same time react back upon the 
world to change it. In other words, ‘social structure’ and ‘social action’ are intimately 
related, with each continuously affecting the other in a dynamic fashion. Whilst social 
structures contain and condition what can be achieved through individual or 
collective human action, human action itself constitutes and in some circumstances 
transforms social structures. These arguments have obvious relevance for industrial 
relations researchers interested in an understanding of the multi-dimensional factors 
that need to be taken into account to explain such things as the nature of workers’ 
bargaining power, how collective trade union organisation is created and maintained, 
and why strikes occur.  
 
Yet ironically, there has always been a strong tradition within industrial 
relations to emphasise ‘social structure’ and downplay ‘agency’. This can be 
illustrated with reference to the classic one-sided structural explanation provided by 
Kerr and Siegel (1954) for why some industries and occupations (such as mining 
and the docks) are more strike-prone than others. Such structural explanations 
concentrate partly on the character of the job and the worker (including the danger 
and physical effort involved, and the form of the production process and its 
technology) together with the fact that workers work in groups and often live in close 
occupational communities, forming an ‘isolated mass’, almost ‘a race apart’ from 
others. More recently, Stirling and Fitzgerald (1999a; 1999b) have put forward a 
similar explanation for the level of union solidarity displayed within the fire service, 
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namely the dangers of the job, and the strong occupational culture and identity, 
combined with the distinctive ‘watch’ system of small-group organisation within the 
fire stations. In both cases, it is argued distinctive structural and organisational 
factors are responsible for encouraging workers to develop a consciousness of 
collective grievance and form a strong emotional attachment to their unions.  
 
But such explanations, on their own, are inadequate, for they fail to explain 
why the structural opportunities and limitations they illuminate become realised or 
missed by those involved on the shopfloor, as well as why union solidarity and strike 
propensity in similar structural conditions can often vary considerably both between 
similar workplaces in the same industry and between similar industries in different 
countries (Eldridge, 1969, Edwards, 1977). This is not to say that such factors are 
unimportant, but that structural characteristics have to be considered in combination 
with other factors concerned with how social actors actually intervene within these 
circumstances; what happens in practice can only be understood by reference to 
how different forms of collective organisation and activity are affected by the 
perceptions, intentions and strategies of the workers involved in particular 
workplaces.  (Kimeldorf, 1988; Edwards, 1988; Blyton and Turnbull, 1998). Utilising 
different levels of analysis - namely (apart from class) industry and the workplace – it 
is possible to see the way in which the interplay between structure and agency can 
operate in highly variable ways. 
 
In attempting to assess the balance of power between workers and managers 
generally within society Martin (1992) has provided a useful check-list of possible 
environmental influences which provide resources which either side can mobilise to 
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their advantage. These include the degree of product market competition; the firm’s 
ability to pay; the type of product (especially perishability); the overall level of 
economic activity; the scope of the labour market; the absolute size of employment 
unit; technology and capital intensity; type of payments system; and the role of the 
government, the law and the media. No single feature in the environment is the 
dominant influence upon the balance of power between workers and management, 
and the different elements are linked to each other both directly and indirectly. But 
significantly, Martin also recognises that workers and management do not respond 
automatically to environmental pressures – there is no inevitable logic of power 
relations. Exercising bargaining power is a conscious act, and workers and 
managers respond to environmental pressures in the light of their own values, beliefs 
and objectives in relation to industrial relations. Absolutely central to the articulation 
of workers’ views in terms relevant to the process of collective bargaining, Martin 
argues, is the role of union representatives, namely shop stewards and full-time 
union officials. There is a need for leadership to focus workers’ varied grievances 
upon common goals and to ensure united action. Thus, whilst environmental (or 
what might be termed objective) factors provide potential power resources within the 
bargaining process, it is the subjective factor which is also important in terms of the 
forms to which they are mobilised. 
 
To take a practical and contemporary example of this dual process, we can 
consider the relatively adversarial nature of worker-management relations within 
Royal Mail during much of the 1990s (Darlington, 1993; Gall, 1995, 2001; Beale, 
1999). Clearly, there have been a number of objective features that explain the high 
level of shopfloor militancy displayed by postal workers, albeit unevenly displayed 
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across the country. These include, the relatively poor terms and conditions of 
employment, with unsociable hours, low levels of pay and heavy dependence of high 
overtime to compensate; the fairly monotonous and labour-intensive factory-like work 
routine for many groups of staff concentrated inside the large city-based process 
centres; Royal Mail’s drive for increased efficiency and more flexible working 
practices, accompanied by a somewhat authoritarian style of supervision and 
management; the product market boom and monopoly position, which has meant 
that, despite moves towards commercialisation, the realities of viability and job loss, 
common to many private and public industries, have been felt less acutely within 
Royal Mail (although this is currently changing). But in addition to these objective 
features, the scale of workers’ militancy has also been dependent upon a crucial 
subjective factor – the extent to which there has been a layer of workplace union 
activists and militants capable of standing up and arguing with their fellow workers, 
and providing rank-and-file leadership often independently of full-time union officials. 
Only by including the subjective dimension, of worker consciousness and the 
interrelations of workers’ definitions and responses, is it possible to obtain a multi-
dimensional picture of industrial relations in the Royal Mail or anywhere else. 
Workers are not the passive recipients or objects of structural processes but are 
constructively engaged in the processes of collective mobilisation.  
 
With such considerations in mind, this article explores merely one (albeit 
highly important and much neglected) aspect of the subjective element in workplace 
industrial relations: namely, the complex relationship between shop stewards’ 
leadership, left-wing activism and collective workplace union organisation. Drawing 
on a wide range of existing empirical evidence, it focuses attention on the crucial role 
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that left-wing shop stewards and activists can play in translating shop-floor 
discontent into a sense of injustice and in mobilising workers for collective action. An 
historical overview of the industrial activities of the British Communist Party is 
provided, followed by a comparison with the Socialist Workers Party, with some 
reflections on the theoretical and practical dilemmas involved. It will become 
apparent to the reader that, whilst attempting to anchor the discussion within a 
broader political economy and structural context, the article necessarily ‘bends the 
stick’ in an attempt to redress the balance of many previous studies, by 
concentrating attention on the role of human agency - rather than on structural 
factors or on the relationship between structure and agency as such.  Moreover, 
instead of exploring agency primarily in terms of the mass of rank-and-file workers 
themselves, it focuses on the role of activist leadership and the part this can play in 
generating collective organisation and activity. It naturally follows that whilst the 
subjective element in industrial relations is inextricably linked to the role of 
leadership, this should not be taken to imply it is simply reducible to it, or that human 
agency can ever operate independently of structural constraints. 
 
 
SHOP STEWARDS’ LEADERSHIP 
 
The question of how collective organisation among workers is created and 
maintained has attracted a good deal of attention from sociologists in recent years, 
although less so amongst industrial relations researchers with one or two notable 
exceptions. Kelly (1997; 1998) has made an important attempt to bring the 
contribution of mobilisation theory, derived from the sociological literature on social 
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movements, into the mainstream of industrial relations analysis. As an alternative 
conceptual framework to the dominant pluralist/HRM perspectives, Kelly’s use of 
mobilisation theory draws on the work of the social historian Tilly (1978) who 
proposed a theory of collective action, as well as others who have attempted to 
explore particular aspects of the same phenomena (McAdam; 1988; Fantasia, 1988; 
Gamson, 1992; Franzosi; 1995; Klandermans, 1997).  
 
At its heart is the fundamental question of how individuals are transformed 
into collective actors willing and able to create and sustain collective organisation 
and engage in collective action against their employers. Utilising evidence from 
Fantasia’s (1988) case studies, Kelly (1997; 1998) has documented how the 
transformation of a set of individuals into a collective actor is normally the work of a 
small but critical mass of workplace activists whose role in industrial relations has 
been seriously understated. First, they carry arguments and frame issues so as to 
promote a sense of grievance or injustice amongst workers by persuading them that 
what they have hitherto considered ‘normal’ or ‘acceptable’ is in fact unjust. Second, 
they encourage a high degree of group cohesion and identity, which encourages 
workers to think about their collective interests in opposition to management. Third, 
they urge the appropriateness of collective action, a process of persuasion that is 
thought to be essential because of the costs of such action and the inexperience of 
many people with its different forms and consequences. Fourth, they legitimise such 
action in the face of counter-mobilisation by the employer.  
 
As Kelly (1998) has acknowledged, whilst the nature and effects of leadership 
on worker mobilisation have rarely been theorised in the industrial relations literature, 
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a number of sociologically-inspired empirically-based workplace case studies over 
the last 25 years (Lane and Roberts, 1971; Beynon, 1973, second edn 1984; Nichols 
and Armstrong, 1976; Nichols and Beynon, 1977; Batstone et al, 1977, 1978, 
Armstrong et al, 1981; Pollert 1981; Edwards and Scullion 1982; Darlington, 1994a) 
have provided rich narrative accounts of the events, actions and arguments that take 
place between shop stewards and their members about management, their jobs, the 
union and strikes. These studies, whilst not ignoring structural factors and 
institutional collective bargaining arrangements, focus attention on the social 
processes of workplace industrial relations. Most of them confirm that activist 
leadership is crucial in articulating workers’ sense of grievance, targeting it at 
employers and organising rank-and-file action.  Even though the majority of these 
studies were concerned with workers in private manufacturing industries (often male) 
in which the sectional shop steward plays a pivotal role, as opposed to workers in 
the public sector (often female) where shopfloor collective bargaining is less well 
established, they raised some important common issues. 
 
 Undoubtedly, one of the most detailed examinations of the processes through 
which workplace union leaders can foster collective organisation and action was 
provided by Batstone et al (1977; 1978) in their study of a large manufacturing plant. 
At the heart of their analysis was the notion of a ‘sophisticated’ shop stewards’ 
organisation, a centralised organisational structure which co-ordinates the activities 
of sectional groups by formulating the most effective bargaining strategy in the light 
of the unions’ relative power position. The focus of attention was placed on the 
relatively small number of ‘leader’ (as opposed to ‘populist’) shop stewards who seek 
to shape a strategic workplace-wide perspective supportive of ‘trade union principles’ 
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of unity and collectivism. The preparedness of the members to act in accordance 
with these principles, Batstone et al made clear, was uncertain and depended, in 
large part, on the continued educational role of the steward leadership to channel 
and control the unsystematic discontent of the rank-and-file. This often involves the 
shop stewards in a protracted process of communication, ‘mobilisation of bias’ and 
‘systems of argument’ to reinforce the collective interests of the group.  
 
Whilst being a highly valuable contribution to the subject, the problem with 
Batstone et al’s analysis is the tendency to assume that leadership is essentially a 
one-way relationship between ‘leader’ shop stewards and the members. Although 
they acknowledge the influence of other key figures on the shopfloor who transmit 
their concerns upwards (namely, the ‘opinion-leader’ and ‘griever’) they saw the 
‘leader’ steward as pivotal in amending and squashing issues and knowing what was 
‘best’ for the members. Their evaluation was based on a set of theoretical 
assumptions that conspicuously neglected to view rank-and-file members’ self-
activity as being absolutely central to workplace unionism. Instead, looking at 
stewards’ organisation through the prism of the ‘leader’ stewards, they develop a 
top-down view of the steward’s relationship to their members. But arguably, this 
conception of the relationship between stewards and members to a large extent 
simplifies and underestimates the complexities involved in what should be seen 
more as a two-way interaction. In other words, it is necessary to consider not only 
the stewards’ attempts to influence the membership, but also members’ expectations 
and their attempts to influence the stewards, which in turn is often directly affected 
by managerial behaviour (Darlington, 1994a). 
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Arguably, Beynon’s (1973) account of shopfloor organisation and 
consciousness at the Ford Halewood plant provided a rather more nuanced 
exploration of this dynamic relationship between shop stewards and their members. 
On the one hand, he explained that whilst the experience of working at Ford’s, with 
its particularly aggressive managerial approach nurtured active workplace 
collectivism amongst workers, this was necessarily an uneven process. Crucially, it 
was the shop stewards who were the catalysts of effective workplace struggle. The 
stewards, who had collectively learned distinctive lessons from their struggles with 
management, developed a more consistent, penetrating and critical analyses of 
class relations than existed generally in the factory. Thus, the stewards did not 
simply express the sentiments of the ordinary worker, but articulated a sophisticated 
‘factory class consciousness’. On the other hand, the perspectives of the stewards 
were developed jointly in a process that actively involved the mass of workers 
through the day-to-day shopfloor struggles they engaged in. It was only in the active 
interplay between steward leadership and membership sentiments that effective 
collective organisation and action was developed and sustained. This involved the 
stewards both listening to ‘the lads’ and arguing with them, it meant both sharing the 
experience of assembly work and giving a lead.  
 
Darlington’s later study (1994a; 1994b) of Ford Halewood also provided 
evidence of the way in which the rank-and-file themselves played a crucial role in 
terms of ‘framing’ issues, translating grievances into a sense of injustice, blaming 
management, engaging in tactical considerations to do with whether the case could 
be won, and taking collective forms of activity aimed at protecting their immediate 
interests. This involved discussions and arguments with their shop steward as to 
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whether or not it was a ‘trade union issue’, whether it was right to make such 
demands, and the degree of support they could expect from their steward, the 
stewards’ body as a whole and full-time union officials. Of course, the high level of 
rank-and-file activity displayed in the Ford Halewood plant during the 1970s stands 
in contrast with the less militant forms of union organisation (in terms of belligerency 
towards management and willingness to engage in industrial action) inside the 
manufacturing plant which was the focus of Batstone et al’s study. It also stands in 
marked contrast with the sort of bureaucratised shop stewards’ organisation, with its 
relatively remote full-time convenors and senior stewards, that developed in many 
large workplaces in Britain from the mid-1970s onwards with the overall decline in 
workers’ struggles and shift in the balance of power in favour of management (Terry, 
1978; Hyman, 1979). In the context of rank-and-file demobilisation and passivity, 
many stewards tended to act much more on behalf of their members, with less 
incentive to involve them in activity or decision making, and the close links binding 
the stewards to the members were loosened.  
 
Yet this was not entirely a one-way process at Ford Halewood or anywhere 
else. There have been important counter-pressures and informal workplace 
sanctions to those acting solely to bureaucratise shop stewards, ensuring stewards 
have been placed under direct forms of scrutiny and accountability (Darlington, 1993; 
1994a; 1994b; 1995; 1998; 2001). Certainly, any adequate understanding of the 
nature of leadership inside the workplace has to take account not only of the more 
obvious role of the shop steward, but also the aspirations and activities of the 
members.  
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Therefore, shop stewards’ leadership can be a crucial factor in collectivising 
workers’ discrete experiences and aspirations in the workplace in forms which can 
encourage united organisation and activity, but such leadership is a dynamic two-
way process with rank-and-file members who themselves can put pressures, and set 
limits, on stewards’ leadership. In turn this will be affected by a variety of other 
structural and organisational features, as well as by management behaviour, the 
nature of the relationship between shop stewards and the wider official union and its 
full-time officers, and the broader balance of power between workers and employers 
within society (Boraston et al, 1975; Darlington, 1994a).  
 
Before moving on, it should be borne in mind the above discussion of shop 
stewards’ leadership has been confined to the parameters of the workplace, and 
mainly at sectional level. The question of leadership could also be considered at 
different levels of union organisation, such as the local union branch, regional 
committee and so on. Nonetheless, arguably by focusing attention on stewards’ 
leadership on the shopfloor within the broader context of a capitalist political 
economy, it is possible to illuminate in graphic relief some of the dynamic processes 
and tensions that exist in other areas of union activity. We can now turn to the 
‘agitator’ theory of strikes and to a consideration of the relationship between 
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THE ‘AGITATOR’ THEORY OF STRIKES 
 
In the past some commentators went much further than merely agreeing that 
shop stewards and other workplace union activists play a crucial role in collectivising 
workers’ discrete experiences and aspirations in forms which can encourage united 
activity. They suggested that industrial conflict was directly attributable to the role of 
‘agitators’ and ‘troublemakers’, invariably of a left-wing political persuasion. Certainly, 
during the Cold War climate of the 1950s and 1960s, government ministers, 
employers and national trade union leaders alike, encouraged by prominent media 
reports, tried to pin the blame for the outbreak of unofficial strikes on agitation by 
Communist Party industrial militants (Stevens, 1999). As Jeffrey and Hennessey 
(1983: 220-1) commented: ‘[During the early 1950s] the government became almost 
obsessed with the domestic threat of Communism…[it] convinced itself that virtually 
all industrial unrest stemmed from a subversive challenge to established order’. This 
hysterical anti-Communism was also partly orchestrated by the TUC. In October 
1948 the General Council accused the British Communist Party of pursuing a 
strategy of industrial disruption on orders from Moscow. ‘Communist influences are 
everywhere at work to frame industrial demands for purposes of political agitation 
and to magnify industrial grievances and bring about stoppages in industry’. It 
warned that the Communist Party through its use of ‘underground methods’ was 
exercising ‘in certain trade union organisations a degree of influence which is out of 
all proportion either to its membership or support’. The Congress overwhelmingly 
backed the TUC’s anti-Communist position (Taylor, 1993).  
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Some leading British industrial relations academics, such as Roberts (1953) 
and Flanders (1968), also tended to stress the importance of agitators and what was 
dubbed ‘Communist penetration’ of the unions (Kelly, 1999). During the industrial 
unrest that swept Britain between 1969-1974 similar arguments were displayed 
about (what Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson, speaking about the 1966 
seamen’s strike had called) ‘politically motivated men’ (and women), and resurfaced 
in one form or another during major local disputes in various industries. During the 
1970s blame for the high strike rate at the British Leyland Longbridge and Cowley 
car plants was firmly placed on respective Communist and Trotskyist shop stewards’ 
influence, dubbed by the tabloid press ‘Red Robbo’ (Derek Robinson) in the former 
and ‘The Mole’ (Alan Thornett) in the latter. During the 1980s, it was Derek Hatton 
and members of the Militant Tendency within the GMB manual workers shop 
stewards’ committee and local Labour Party that became the focus of blame for the 
alleged havoc brought about by Liverpool City Council’s defiance of Conservative 
government policy. Elsewhere the finger of blame was pointed at members of the 
Socialist Workers Party (SWP). Roger Rosewall, a former industrial organiser of the 
International Socialists (forerunners of the SWP), who renounced his past and 
converted to the task of countering the alleged ‘Marxist threat’ posed to managers on 
behalf of the right-wing free enterprise organisation Aims of Industry, claimed: 
 
Unlike ordinary trade unionists, they don’t want increased pay for its own sake; they want it in 
order to stir up trouble and weaken the economies of capitalist countries. For Marxists strikes 
are what Lenin called ‘Schools of War’ and every pay claim is a battle for Communism. For 
Marxists, conflict and grievances are the means to a political end. The language they use, the 
comparisons they draw, the emotions they tap, and the agitation they are trained to spread, 
can all inflame dissatisfaction and manufacture discontent (1982: 1-2).  
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Emphasis is placed almost entirely on the alleged covert political objectives of 
strike leaders who appear to have a charismatic appeal capable of inducing blind 
obedience from otherwise rational workers The implication is that if only these 
‘subversives’ were not stirring things up workers would establish a harmonious 
relationship with management from which there would be mutual advantage. 
 
Of course, this ‘agitator theory’ to explain strikes reveals a fundamental 
ignorance of the manner in which workers take action in opposition to management. 
If it were true, as is implied, that left-wing militants were really unconcerned with the 
immediate demands and needs of union members and were using strikes for their 
own ulterior motives, it seems likely this would soon become apparent to workers 
themselves, particularly as the media often portrays left-wing organisations in this 
light. Moreover, agitation is unlikely to fall on receptive ears unless there are genuine 
widespread grievances and justifiable demands to agitate about. In adapting one of 
Mao Zedong’s famous sayings, Cockburn (1976) explained that agitators must ‘swim 
like fishes in the sea’, which necessarily implies there is a suitable sea already there 
for them to swim in. Therefore, to wholly attribute industrial disputes to agitators, 
effectively explaining complex social processes exclusively in terms of the 
intervention of key individuals, is to exaggerate their influence. Hyman (1989a: 61) 
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ROLE OF LEFT-WING ACTIVISTS 
 
Nonetheless, in dismissing the ‘agitator’ theory of strikes there is the danger of 
throwing the baby out with the bathwater (Kelly, 1995) by downplaying the role of 
left-wing political activists in workplace union activity and mobilisation. Ironically, 
during the 1960s and 1970s many industrial relations researchers, in an 
understandable attempt to refute the popular ‘agitator theory’ of strikes, fell into the 
alternative danger of considerably underestimating the influence of Communist Party 
shop stewards and activists in industrial relations. In effect, by stressing the role of 
structural, organisational and institutional factors in shop stewards’ behaviour, there 
was a ‘conspiracy of silence’ on the issue of Communist influence. The Donovan 
Commission’s Report (1968) and its associated research papers (McCarthy, 1967; 
McCarthy and Parker, 1968), as well as Brown (1973) and Goodman and 
Whittingham’s (1973) studies of shop stewards provide vivid examples of this. So, 
paradoxically, did Hyman’s (1975, 1989a) pioneering Marxist analysis of industrial 
relations. Similarly, Taylor’s (1993) broad historical survey of unions and politics in 
the post-war years made no real attempt to relate industrial militancy, particularly the 
strike wave of 1969-1974, to the role of the left, notably the Communist Party. Such 
neglect seems remarkable given that the British Communist Party during the 1960s 
and 1970s, an organisation with between 25-30,000 members and with a network of 
shop stewards in a number of industries and unions, appears to have been influential 
in many important workers’ struggles (Thompson, 1992; Mcllroy, 1999a, 2000b; 
Mcllroy and Campbell, 1999; Darlington and Lyddon, 2001). 
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This tendency to disregard the role of left-wing political activists and shop 
stewards (either from the Communist Party or other left-wing groups) continued to 
affect much industrial relations research throughout the 1980s and 1990s (and the 
same could be said about right-wing activism, such as Catholic Action). Thus, the 
vast majority of IR textbooks produced during this period, with some exceptions 
(Mcllroy, 1995), either completely ignored their influence within the workplace or 
unions or referred to it only in passing (for example, see Gospel and Palmer, 1993; 
Farnham and Pimlott, 1995; Edwards, 1995; Beardwell, 1996; Salaman, 1998; 
Burchill, 1997; Kessler and Bayliss, 1998; Blyton and Turnbull (1998). Equally, there 
is little literature on the influence of organised left-wing political factions within the 
unions’ policy making bodies (again with some exceptions: Lipset, 1956; Undy et al, 
1981; 1996; Seifert, 1984; Carter, 1997; Mcllroy, 2000a, 2000b; Gall, 2001). Yet 
trade unions are often the site of intense ideological struggles between different 
groups of activists about the definition of members’ interests and the most 
appropriate means for their pursuit. Moreover, such ideological struggles are also to 
be found within the collective bargaining arena, related to different strategies of how 
to react to and confront employers.  
 
Even Batstone et al’s (1977; 1978) detailed case study into the nature of 
collective trade union organisation and strike mobilisation revealed the same 
limitations. Their fleeting recognition of the existence of ‘hardliners’ within the leading 
group of shop stewards, who adopt a militant stance towards management (as 
opposed to a more pragmatic or moderate ‘strong bargaining relationship’), 
illustrates how it is possible to have quite different assessments of the appropriate 
strategy to pursue vis-à-vis management based on different political sympathies and 
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allegiances. Yet this internal faction-fighting that sometimes takes place amongst 
stewards, reflecting differing currents of concern and activity amongst rank-and-file 
workers, was an aspect of workplace unionism which Batstone et al’s work did not 
explore.  
 
More recent studies have also been inattentive to the politics of workplace 
representation. Thus, Fosh (1993), Fosh and Cohen (1990) and Fairbrother (1990; 
1994; 1996; 2000), in their attempt to highlight the possibilities for the ‘renewal’ of 
workplace union organisation towards more active and participative forms, have 
emphasised the importance of local leaders’ commitment to traditions of collectivism 
and solidarity. But like Batstone et al, such commentators either ignore or completely 
downplay the significance of the fact that some of the main individuals involved are 
left-wing activists of one description or another, whether this is defined in terms of 
fixed affiliation to a political party or in the broader sense of a form of ‘quasi-
syndicalism’ reflecting an emphasis on industrial struggle rather than political 
generalisation but with a consistently antagonistic attitude towards management. 
Even though Fairbrother (1996: 114) has acknowledged that the processes of union 
renewal ‘require a direct engagement and consideration of the politics of trade 
unionism’, he does not draw out the distinctive ways in which left-wing union activists 
have attempted to contribute to generating the type of collective participation and 
democratic accountability from below which he views as necessary for such 
workplace union ‘renewal’ (Gall, 1998).  
 
In fact during the last 25 years there have only been a handful of studies that 
have explicitly attempted to understand the way in which the political inclination of 
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activists and shop stewards can be an extremely influential, although by no means 
exclusive, factor shaping the nature of workplace relations (including Beynon, 1973; 
Foster and Woolfson, 1986; Spencer, 1989). For example, Nichols and Beynon 
(1977) documented the profound differences that existed between two shop 
stewards, Alfie and Greg, in the ChemCo plant they studied. Alfie, was a trade union 
‘loyalist’ with a moral condemnation of his members ‘selfish’ demands, whereas 
Greg, a Communist Party sympathiser, stressed not so much the strength gained 
from the bureaucratic use of ‘constitutional action’ by shop stewards but rather the 
autonomous collective action of the members themselves. Nichols and Beynon 
attributed such differences about union organisation, the source of its strength, and 
of their fellow workers, to the different political traditions that exist within the working 
class movement. Similarly, recent case studies by Darlington (1993; 1994a; 1994b; 
1995; 1998; 2001) have revealed the significance of shop stewards’ political 
affiliations, and the influence and leadership that groups of political activists can 
exert on workplace activity in the Royal Mail, Fire Brigade, London Underground, 
and airport and car industries.  
 
Although industrial action on occasion occurs relatively spontaneously, in 
terms of the initiative being taken by rank-and-file workers rather than shop 
stewards, it is often the leadership provided by shop stewards and other union 
activists that provides an organised collective form to workers’ discrete grievances. 
Indeed, shop stewards’ dedication to building and sustaining workplace trade union 
organisation, and their bargaining skills and appreciation of strategy and tactics 
acquired through previous experience, and the networks of support provided by 
union organisation generally, can often prove crucial to the effectiveness of a strike 
 - 19 - 
and its eventual outcome. In this sense, there is an element of truth in the agitator 
thesis: industrial conflict occurs only where real grievances exist, but to take an 
organised form it often requires the articulation of shop stewards and other union 
activists whose commitment to collectivist principles of trade unionism is potentially 
deeper rooted. Whilst most are neither necessarily militant nor left-wing, it seems 
clear that politically conscious shop stewards and union activists with an overtly 
ideological and solidaristic (rather than instrumental and individualistic) commitment 
to trade unionism, can play a crucial role in mobilising workers to take militant action. 
 
This does not mean left-wing union representatives are hell-bent on any 
sinister or manipulative intent. Most shop stewards, including their left-wing varieties, 
are elected by the members because of their commitment to fighting to improve 
workers’ pay and conditions within the workplace. The generally more adversarial 
approach to management which is adopted by left-wing stewards can fits the needs 
and aspirations of the members who elect them, sometimes irrespective of the 
steward’s expressed broader political beliefs and affiliation. By contrast, in the 
building industry the casual nature of the work and notorious widespread use of the 
‘blacklist’ by employers, has often meant that only the most determined left-wing 
inclined militants have been prepared to take up the position of shop steward 
(Austrin, 1978). Whatever the circumstances of their election, such shop stewards 
are responsible to their members on a day-to-day basis, and come under direct and 
regular pressure not to run too far ahead (or behind) them in terms of what forms of 
action they may or may not propose, and the type of leadership they provide. Of 
course, it is possible for left-wing shop stewards to become removed from their 
members on ideological and political grounds (as it is for their right-wing 
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counterparts), but they are unlikely to retain influence unless their leadership reflects 
the immediate concerns and objectives of rank-and-file members. They may be 
forced to resign by an ad hoc vote of members or removed informally, if not by loss 
of office, by others who command wider support. Similar pressures of accountability 
operate on left-wing union activists who hold no representative function inside the 
workplace.  
 
Nonetheless, despite such constraints it is clear that left-wing stewards and 
activists inevitably carry a distinctive type of political outlook inside the workplace. As 
a result, the politics of union leadership can be an important ingredient, amongst 
other factors, to an understanding of the dynamics of workplace industrial relations 
and trade unionism. Of course, there have always been wide divergences between 
members/supporters of different left-wing political parties such as the Communist 
Party, the Socialist Workers Party and the Labour Party left. There are also 
differences between members/supporters of such parties and the much larger 
numbers of non-aligned but politically conscious union militants (including 
syndicalist-inclined activists). But there are some general characteristics they all 
share in common. For example, there is a conscious recognition that management’s 
role as a servant of capital accumulation means there is a constant drive to exploit 
workers and intensify the pressure of work. There is a commitment to building the 
strength of union organisation through opposition to managerial intransigence, in the 
process challenging alternative more pragmatic and moderate strategies advocated 
by other leading activists inside the workplace, as well as encouraging their 
members who might not share all their political ideas to be prepared to engage in 
militant collective action. There is a commitment to show their fellow workers how 
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their specific grievances are related to the concerns of other workers both in the 
same workplace and more generally inside the working class movement in Britain 
and internationally. And there is a commitment to a basic socialist belief in the 
redistribution of wealth and power in society.  
 
However, left-wing activists who are members of political parties can be 
further identified from either their organised supporters or other non-aligned militants 
in the following ways (which are explored further in the next two sections of the 
paper). They are likely to have access to highly sophisticated national and locally 
based resources of communication and co-ordination of both a political and 
organisational nature; to be especially conscious of the history of working class 
struggle and the process of revolutionary change; to be committed to the tasks of 
distributing agitational leaflets and selling socialist newspapers with the explicit aim 
of winning political influence and new adherents to their party; and to be concerned 
with building socialist leadership inside the workplace and unions that can develop 
workers’ struggles from defensive battles into an offensive challenge to the very 
nature of capitalism. 
 
Whether left-wing activists are members of a political party or not, and 
whether they are shop stewards or not, their distinctive view of the nature of worker-
management relations, of how to build shopfloor union organisation, and the merits 
of industrial action, can be an important factor in helping to influence their fellow 
workers ideas and activity, and in challenging alternative strategies and tactics. (Of 
course, we should not assume this is an unproblematic process. For example, not 
only can sections of the rank-and-file be sectional, sexist and racist, features which 
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can also shape the role of the shop steward, but also some left-wing stewards may 
alienate themselves or become marginalised from many workers precisely because 
of their left-wing political beliefs). In order to make a more practical assessment of 
the role of left-wing activists inside the workplace it is useful to make a brief historical 
consideration of the activities of the Communist Party, followed by an examination of 
contemporary left-wing groups such as the Socialist Workers Party. 
 
 
THE COMMUNIST PARTY 
 
Throughout the period of its existence, from its formation in 1920 until its demise in 
1991, the British Communist Party (CP) played an important role in industrial 
relations, particularly in terms of providing leadership to workers’ struggles against 
the employers and government. The arrest and imprisonment of twelve of the 
leaders of the Communist Party prior to the General Strike of 1926 was evidence of 
its perceived threat by the establishment, although this did not prevent CP members 
playing a crucial role during the strike. The CP were also pivotal to the union 
recognition disputes and the rebuilding of shop stewards’ organisation in the the re-
armament years of the late 1930s, to the joint production committees established 
during the second world war, and to the spread of unofficial strikes and growing 
power of shop stewards’ organisation in the immediate post-war period (Croucher, 
1982; Thompson, 1992; Fishman, 1995; Campbell et al, 1999; Mcllroy, 2000b; 
Mcllroy et al, 1999).  
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During the 1960s and 1970s there were between 25-30,000 Communist Party 
members, with a network of shop stewards in a number of industries and unions. 
This meant they were able to act as a focus for the industrial activities of other 
militants whose politics were those of the Labour left, albeit mostly without any 
formal political affiliation. Thus, literally hundreds of thousands of workers who would 
never have voted Communist or read its Morning Star newspaper willingly accepted 
the leadership of Communist shop stewards and union officials for their role in 
fighting to improve wages and conditions through militant union organisation. 
Although the party’s programme The British Road to Socialism committed the party 
to the parliamentary road to socialism through the election of a left-wing Labour 
government, there was still considerable emphasis placed on industrial and trade 
union activity, including the building of factory party branches.  
 
In the process, the Communist Party became the major activist force in the 
engineering industry in Sheffield and Manchester, in shipbuilding on the Clyde, and 
in the Scottish, Welsh and Kent coalfields. It was also an influential force in a number 
of other areas, including Fleet Street in London, the British Leyland Longbridge plant 
in Birmingham, the Ford plant in Dagenham, in engineering plants throughout 
Scotland and London, the building industry in London and Birmingham, and the 
docks in London (Harman, 1988). Communist Party members played a prominent 
role in the leadership of many of the local and national industrial disputes that took 
place, for example the Roberts-Arundel strike of 1967-8 (Arnison, 1970) and the sit-
in at Upper Clyde Shipbuilders in 1971-2 (Foster and Woolfson, 1986). Through the 
CP-dominated Liaison Committee for the Defence of Trade Unions it also brought 
together militants from different industries and unions into a national movement that 
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was able to call one-day unofficial strikes involving half-a-million workers against 
Labour’s In Place of Strife in 1969, and the Tories’ Industrial Relations Bill in 1970, 
and which was crucial to the unofficial strike movement in protest at the 
imprisonment of the Pentonville dockers which forced the TUC General Council to 
call a general strike in 1972 (Lindop, 1998; Mcllroy and Campbell, 1999; Darlington 
and Lyddon, 2001). Meanwhile, the party’s Broad Left electoral strategy, of forming 
electoral alliances of Communist and left Labour activists, with the aim of replacing 
right-wing union officials with left-wingers, successfully led to CP members gaining 
national executive and full-time official positions in a number of different trade unions 
(Shipley, 1976, Baker, 1981; Harman, 1985; Mcllroy, 2000b; Mcllroy et al, 1999).  
 
Of course, the industrial influence the CP had amongst the mass of workers 
should not be exaggerated. Certainly, if by ‘influence’ we mean the ability of 
Communists to persuade fellow workers of their ultimate objective of a socialist 
transformation of society, then the CP’s industrial influence was small as the number 
of party members suggests. In fact, only a minority of shop stewards in Britain could 
be regarded as being consciously and actively political. In 1968, only 17 per cent 
belonged to a political party, and in most cases this was the Labour Party (McCarthy 
and Parker, 1968). However, if by Communist influence we mean the ability to 
persuade workers to adopt attitudes or take action on day-to-day union issues, then 
it was clearly a force to be reckoned with amongst a significant minority (as was also 
the case with the CP in the United States; see Keeran, 1980).  
 
Two easily overlooked characteristics of the party contributed to its influence 
in this second sense. First, though the party was small, its influence reached far 
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beyond its membership. Part of this influence was due to the relatively large number 
of people who joined but then left the party (although usually not because of 
disagreement with its politics) and remained supporters. Partly it was due to a wide 
layer of other activists who, although they never joined, sympathised and were 
prepared to work with the party. Second, the Communists had certain qualities by 
virtue of their political philosophy as well as their experience and organisational 
connections that enabled them to play an important role in building effective 
shopfloor union organisation. Put simply, they knew how to recruit workers to trade 
unionism, to fight for improved wages and conditions, to build strong shop stewards’ 
organisation, to conduct strikes, to mobilise resources and support outside their 
particular workplace amongst other party members and trade unionists. Indeed, in 
many respects, Communist industrial influence appears to have stemmed from the 
correspondence of their ideas of working class defiance to the aspirations of many 
workers and to the requirements of union organisation, and their blue-print for 
advance compared with alternative right-wing Labour strategies (Stevens, 1999). 
 
Nonetheless, there were a number of organisational and political dilemmas 
with the CP’s approach to building influence on the shopfloor. First, the party’s 
industrial work was unevenly and unsystematically organised. In theory, the party’s 
factory branches would meet regularly, bringing together Communists militants from 
across the workplace to exchange news about conditions on the shopfloor, to agree 
on strategies to fight for amongst the members and within the shop stewards’ 
committee, to hold general political education discussions, to organise the sale of the 
their newspaper Morning Star; and to recruit workers to the party. However, in 
practice, many workplace party branches did not meet regularly, the majority of party 
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members were inactive, and few sold the Morning Star at work (Mcllroy, 1999a, 
2000b). Second, although CP members led strikes against government imposed 
incomes policies and anti-union legislation, the party’s industrial intervention often 
tended to lack a sharp political cutting edge in terms of an explicit attempt to link 
shopfloor agitation with socialist politics. The pull of syndicalism was especially 
strong, with many party members operating more as industrial, as opposed to, 
political militants. Paradoxically it was less the Communists’ politics that counted, in 
terms of their influence on the shopfloor, than their determination to pursue rank-
and-file workers’ grievances and uphold their interests against employers and the 
government (Stevens, 1999; Mcllroy, 1999a, 2000b).  
 
Third, there was the negative impact of the process of maturation of the CP’s 
influence within many shop stewards’ bodies. Thus, in the larger factories and 
workplaces, CP militants increasingly became caught up in the process whereby 
convenors and senior stewards came to occupy full-time positions. In these 
circumstances, managers learnt to work with, and accommodate to, their influence, 
attempting to avoid stoppages of work by engaging in ‘pragmatic’ bargaining 
relations of give-and-take. In response, the nature of the CP stewards’ hitherto 
militant relationship with management changed, and some leading party figures 
increasingly became bureauractically remote from the experience of the shopfloor 
workers they represented (Lyddon, 1977). Fourth, despite the widespread industrial 
militancy and political generalisation of the early 1970s the CP generally proved 
unable to recruit large numbers of workers, and continued on its long-established 
path of a declining and ageing membership. Arguably, the main reason for this 
decline was political rather than organisational. From the early 1950s the CP had 
 - 27 - 
formally abandoned revolutionary socialist politics for a strategy based essentially on 
changing society through a left parliamentary government. But there was already a 
large and well-established social democratic party in the shape of the Labour Party, 
and faced with a choice between a large social democratic organisation and a small 
one, most of the so-called ‘progressives’ the CP aimed to win tended to opt for 
Labour.  
 
Fifth, the CP’s parliamentary strategy, which obliged it to attempt to influence 
the leadership of the trade unions to help push the Labour Party to the left, was 
translated into trade union electoralism. Thus, primary importance was attached to 
trying to replace right-wing full-time trade union officials through the election of left-
wingers, notably by supporting such figures as Hugh Scanlon in the AUEW and Jack 
Jones in the TGWU. But the price of this electoral strategy was the CP’s growing 
reluctance to clash with the left officials. This contradiction between trying to give a 
lead to independent rank-and-file militancy and trying to cultivate influence amongst 
left-wing officials became increasingly apparent during the 1970s wave of industrial 
unrest, with the CP increasingly subordinating the former in favour of the latter 
(Lindop, 1998; Darlington and Lyddon, 2001).  
 
Despite such dilemmas, the Communist Party’s industrial base in specific 
regions and unions, was still influential. It offered a national pole of opposition to the 
employers and the government, and its network of shop stewards and lay activists 
meant it was able to lead or strongly influence many of the important rank-and-file 
struggles that took place. Although there is some literature on the CP’s industrial 
work there is a need for more detailed studies of how the party’s trade union 
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interventions were organised and of the relationship between union activists and the 
party.  
 
THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY  
 
From 1968 onwards the revolutionary left in Britain suddenly found their ideas had 
acquired a much wider audience. Whilst this revolutionary left did not seriously 
challenge the industrial and political hegemony of the Communist Party, they were 
able to exercise some limited influence on workplace union activity in certain areas. 
For example, the Workers Revolutionary Party built a relatively strong network inside 
the stewards’ body at the Cowley car assembly plant (Thornett, 1987; 1998; Mcllroy, 
1999b). But it was the International Socialists, later renamed the Socialist Workers 
Party (SWP), who were able to build the most credible hard-left influence amongst 
workers during the massive upturn in workers’ struggles of the early 1970s (Shipley, 
1976; Callinicos, 1982; Callaghan, 1984; Harman, 1988; Mcllroy, 1999b). They 
produced a book, The Employers’ Offensive (Cliff, 1970), which emphasised how 
important productivity deals and the employers’ drive from piece-work to measured 
day work were in undermining shopfloor strength, which sold 20,000 copies almost 
entirely to shop stewards. They recruited many young workers to an organisation 
that grew to about 4,000-strong, including some 40 workplace branches in key plants 
such as Chrysler’s Linwood (Glasgow) and Ryton (Coventry) plants and the Royal 
Group of Docks (London), although most of these branches did not survive for long. 
And their influence extended from traditional manual workers to many different 
sections of white-collar workers, including teachers, civil servants, and local 
government office workers. 
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Unlike the Communist Party with its electoralist orientation on capturing left-
wing control of the union machine (as part of the wider strategy of reforming society 
from above), the SWP placed the emphasis on the need for militant rank-and-file 
activity on the shopfloor (as part of a wider strategy for social revolution from below). 
In pursuit of this strategy it took the initiative to launch rank-and-file organisations 
and newspapers in a number of different industries and unions, which linked together 
many thousands of activists who, although not party members, recognised the need 
for class-wide struggle independently of the official union leadership. A national rank-
and-file movement was launched which aimed to challenge the perceived 
subordination to official union structures by the Communist Party (Callinicos, 1982). 
However, the SWP’s growth inside the unions did not arise merely from industrial 
agitation. The party and its paper Socialist Worker also placed a strong emphasis on 
taking political issues into the workplace, for example, the campaign against racism 
and Nazi organisations, for women’s liberation, as well as on the need for a Marxist 
understanding of society generally. It was seen as essential to politicise the industrial 
struggle, to overcome the traditional separation of economics and politics, by linking 
the fight for workers immediate demands over wages and conditions to the overall 
battle to bring down the government and overthrow capitalism through mass working 
class action.  
 
The general downturn in workers’ struggle that occurred with the ‘Social 
Contract’ under the Labour government from the mid-1970s onwards (despite the 
‘winter of discontent’ strike wave of 1978-9), followed by the series of defeats under 
the Conservatives during the 1980s, undermined the basis for a national rank-and-
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file movement.  The inhospitable objective situation led to the abandonment of the 
building of rank-and-file groups as an immediate strategy. Nonetheless, a more party 
orientated industrial intervention (involving selling Socialist Worker, raising general 
political topics and working around industrial disputes) maintained a base inside the 
workplace and unions. Significantly, the party’s forthright anti-Stalinist stance meant 
the demise of the Communist Party in the early 1990s in the wake of the collapse of 
the Eastern European ‘socialist’ states, impacted positively rather than negatively on 
its immediate political periphery. At the same time, the political radicalisation that 
occurred amongst a sizeable minority of workers under Conservative governments 
after the defeat of the poll tax saw the SWP grow to an organisation of about 6,000 
members, making it by far the largest and single most important revolutionary 
socialist organisation in Britain (and Europe) today. Tony’s Blair’s ‘Third Way’ pro-
capitalist politics, and the collapse of the traditional Labour Party left, has merely 
further encouraged this process.  
 
It should be noted that during the 1990s the SWP were not the only left-wing 
organisation to have built some influence within the trade unions. There was the 
Socialist Party (SP), successor to Labour’s one time Militant Tendency, one of 
whose leading members was a strong contender for the general secretary’s position 
in Britain’s largest union, UNISON. There was the Scottish Socialist Party (SSP), 
which spectacularly won a seat in the new Scottish Assembly in 1999 and received 
union support in a number of areas. And there was the Socialist Labour Party (SLP), 
headed by the well-known miners’ union leader Arthur Scargill, who won a sizeable 
number of votes in local and parliamentary elections in 1999 and who built a credible 
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base at both activist and official union level inside the RMT, particularly on the 
London Underground (Darlington, 2001).  
 
But given that the SWP is the largest of the far-left groups in Britain it is useful 
to make some comparison - by way of illustration of similar dilemmas faced by all 
left-wing groups today - with the Communist Party’s earlier attempts to encourage 
union collectivism, shopfloor militancy and wider political generalisation. Of course, 
there are significant differences between the industrial activities of the CP and SWP, 
in part related to the very different historical, economic and political circumstances in 
which they have operated, but also to variations in political approach (for example, 
the attitude towards union officialdom). But there have clearly been a number of 
factors in recent years that have prevented the SWP, as well as other left-wing 
groups, from being able to fill the vacuum left by the demise of the Communist Party.  
 
First, there has been the shift in the balance of power in favour of the 
employers and the massive decline in the level of workers’ militancy in Britain over 
the last 20 years, which has had a generally negative impact on the spread of 
socialist ideas and organisation. Such a development cannot be overestimated, 
since the direct connection between workers’ confidence to fight and their potential 
attraction to left-wing political organisation seems clear. This has been compounded 
by the structural changes in the nature of workforce from manufacturing to the 
service sector industry and the resulting haemorrhage in levels of trade union 
membership. Second, there has been the legacy of a generational loss of many 
thousands of trade union militants who previously looked to the Communist Party, 
but who have either entered into union officialdom and moved rightwards politically, 
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or are no longer active in trade union affairs (some having retired).  Whilst the SWP 
and SLP have been able to attract a layer of new young workers during the 1990s, 
they have not been able to recreate the same national political network of 
established and prominent shop stewards and union branch activists, who in turn 
might be able to influence many thousands of other workers.  
 
Third, the SWP’s conscious attempt to try to prevent its members becoming 
narrowly preoccupied with trade union issues to the exclusion of raising general 
socialist politics in the workplace, and from becoming bureaucratically removed from 
their members during a period of low level of workers’ struggle, has meant 
discouraging them from taking on union positions beyond the level of (and 
sometimes including) the shop steward, thereby also limiting their potential influence. 
By contrast, the greater emphasis placed on capturing the official union machine by 
the SLP (like the Communist Party in the past) has enabled a broader degree of 
influence in some unions such as the RMT, although this has also made it more 
susceptible to internal factional disputes within the union apparatus (Darlington, 
2001).  
 
Fourth, the SWP’s extra-parliamentary politics, with its advocacy of mass 
strikes and socialist revolution to overthrow capitalism, has also limited its potential 
appeal to those trade union activists looking for a pole of opposition to ‘Social 
Partnership’ and New Labour but with a less ultra-confrontational edge. By contrast, 
the SLP and SSP’s more electorally orientated politics, standing parliamentary 
candidates on a platform of broad socialist demands, appears to have been more 
attractive to a wider pool of disaffected union voters, albeit still of relative minority 
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appeal. Fifth, involvement in socialist politics and militant union activity has also 
made left-wing activists, whatever their party affiliation, vulnerable to management 
harassment and victimisation, and to being ostracised by union officialdom. Recent 
examples of this have been attempts by national leaders of UNISON to discipline 
prominent SWP union branch activists and shop stewards involved in leading 
unofficial disputes in London, Sheffield, Newcastle and Glasgow. 
 
Despite such limitations, and what Mcllroy (2000a) has derided as the 
apparent ‘catastophism….impatience and economism which have been hallmarks of 
the British left’ in the past, it remains possible the SWP and other left-wing groups 
could grow significantly in numbers and influence inside the unions in opposition to 
New Labour in the future. The prospects for such a development have undoubtedly 
been encouraged by the recent decision of the SWP to build up a national network of 
Socialist Alliances in England and Wales (which unite the SWP and other far-left 
groups together with ex-Labour Party members, independent socialists, union 
militants, single-issue activists and anti-globalisation campaigners) and to merge 
with the SSP in Scotland. The relative success of this reorganisation became 
apparent In the 2000 London Assembly and 2001 general elections when the 
Socialist Alliance and Scottish Socialist Party succeeded in presenting a creditable 
and widespread electoral intervention to the left of Labour, and has subsequently 
been confirmed by the building up of new-style broad-based left-wing campaigning 
activist organisations that have attracted support at different levels inside some 
unions.  
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The revival of the British left has also been reflected in the election of a 
number of left-leaning union general secretaries and at the general frustration with 
the New Labour government amongst a growing minority of trade unionists, 
highlighted in sharp relief by the Fire Brigades Union’s 2001 decision that its political 
fund should in future only be used to support electoral candidates and organisations 
who uphold the union’s policies, even if this means opposing Labour Party 
candidates. It is a revival process that could be greatly encouraged with any 
resurgence of workers’ militancy in Britain, notably on the issue of the government’s 
attempt to introduce the private market into public services. But whether or not 
political activists from this newly reconstructed British left would be able to decisively 
affect the actual outcome of events in such circumstances, their current day-to-day 
attempt to influence their fellow workers ideas and activity, and to challenge 
alternative strategies and tactics, is undoubtedly a significant factor in industrial 






One of the reasons why left-wing influence within workplace unionism is of particular 
importance is because for many commentators the advocacy of an adversarial 
approach to industrial relations is regarded as being merely self-destructive and self-
defeating in the current era of globalisation. Thus, it is argued that union survival and 
recovery in the 21st century will depend on the willingness of unions and their 
members to behave ‘moderately’ and to engage in a ‘social partnership’ between 
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workers and employers. This means abandoning an adversarial approach and 
accepting the need for co-operation to change workplace culture towards a more 
consensual direction (Taylor, 1994; TUC, 1997; Unions ‘21, 1999). However, as 
Kelly (1996) has argued, militancy is often necessary in the face of the growing 
hostility of employers to any form of unionism and collective bargaining which makes 
social partnership impossible to achieve. Compared with militancy gains from 
moderation are generally meagre, whether measured by membership increases or 
union strength and influence. Moreover, moderation can seriously weaken trade 
unions and leave them vulnerable to employers’ attacks because they erode the 
willingness and capacity of members to resist and to challenge employer demands. 
(As with anything else, this is not a uniform process. Indeed, certain groups of 
workers, particularly those who are strategically placed in bargaining terms, may find 
otherwise). Nonetheless, even Kelly does not consider the ways in which left-wing 
activists might play an important role in providing a coherent political alternative to 
the ‘pragmatism’ of New Labour policies and its notions of ‘Social Partnership’. 
 
Of course, this does not mean falling into the trap of assuming that the 
fortunes of left-wing leadership can be viewed irrespective of objective 
circumstances. As we have previously explored, there are numerous factors that 
come in to play in shaping the balance of power between workers and management. 
The nature of employer and government attacks, the level of organisation and 
consciousness of workers, the strength of traditions of solidarity, how angry workers 
are, how confident they are they can do something about it, the willingness to 
engage in struggle, the degree of official union support, and the character and level 
of workers’ struggle in society generally are crucial factors to take into account. 
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Other specifically structural and organisational features of the work situation, which 
are beyond the control of individuals, will also be significant. Thus, only if the 
question of left-wing workplace leadership is anchored within this broader context 
can we appreciate the material constraints and limitations to militant workers’ activity 
that can operate. Nonetheless, it also has to be remembered that workplace 
relations can also change very quickly, so that an apparently cowed workforce, with 
a hitherto ‘pragmatic’ leadership, can suddenly explode into militant action. This in 
turn can to a situation where left-wing activists, who have previously been relatively 
marginalised in terms of influence, can potentially gain a much wider hearing for their 
ideas, and even play a decisive role in terms of the outcome of events.  
 
At the very least, it seems justifiable to suggest that without much more 
extensive research into the influence that left-wing activists can exert in the 
workplace, and the discussions, debates and arguments involved in deciding what 
are the most appropriate ways of ‘framing’ issues around which workers can be 
mobilised for action, including different political conceptions between activists and 
rank-and-file members, the dynamics of workplace union organisation will remain 
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